dimanche, septembre 03, 2017

koréa 3- 03.09.17, korea, united states, china, russia, reunification, war, weaponry


 Google translation at the end of the text


Paris on Sunday 3 September 2017

Copy:
Embassies of China, South Korea, North Korea, United States, Europe, Japan, Russia.
President of the French Republic

Reflection on the Korean crisis

The poverty of the remarks of the statesmen leads the quidams to participate in the public reflection on the reasons for the repetition of the Korean crises.

Instead of seeking the Good and the Bad, it is better to ask what drives the policies of the two Koreas and ultimately constitutes their raison d'etre.

Before being a different social-economic regime, the two Koreas are first of all zones whose primary function is the exclusion of the military power of the opposite camp and the preservation of a political monopoly in its own camp.

It is not the populations that define these two state entities. These are the military-political apparatuses that were produced by the rifts of the Second World War.

The frontier of the 38th parallel is not a separation of two sovereignties but the true constitutional reference of these two political regimes.

This separation strictly defines the political line of these two military regimes. It is the quest for reunification. Separation justifies, legalises, and bases the thesis of reunification.

Both sides consider that this peace in separation is transitory and that the aim of the policy of each of the two parties is to unify the two parties and to reconstitute a single country.

In other words, unifying reconquest is the political and diplomatic standard for both parties.

Today, the novelty is that one of the two camps can no longer support civil competition vis-à-vis the other and that the unifying reconquest is no longer a rhetoric for him.

North Korea has missed a turning point and neither the Russian Federation nor the People's Republic of China envisage participating in any reunification of the two Koreas and a fortiori to support North Korea in such a chimera.

These two powers support North Korea first because it is the territorial access to their own territory. These two countries can not agree to see the United States moving to their borders.

If North Korea can no longer ensure this continuity in unifying ambition, it does not come out of the unitary demand.

She finds it in the other side, the alliance of South Korea and the United States.

It adapts to its inferiority vis-à-vis South Korea and expresses the unifying ideology in uncompromising defense of a besieged country.
South Korea has strengthened its positions and preserved its unifying impulses intact.

The numbers of hesitation are there only to mask the primary purpose of the South Korean policy supported by the United States, or the reverse, which is to integrate North Korea to its power perimeter.

The arming of North Korea does not therefore disturb the peaceful tranquility of peaceful coexistence.

It is an answer to a double question:
a- The inability of North Korea to subjugate South Korea and develop a declared policy of unifying reconquest.
b- The inclusion of South Korea in the continuation of the policy of unifying reconquest.

By this armaments, North Korea reproduces the ideology of the reconquest by transforming it into a policy of opposition to any absorption or subjugation by South Korea.

North Korea thus maintains the military debate and has the means to oppose all forms of right-of-way on the part of South Korea and the United States.

The Camp that can no longer win this race for reunification remains in the competition by forbidding the other to do so.

The repetition of antagonisms as well as the constitution of the means to support them are produced by the denial of the nonsense of the policy of reunification.

As long as this issue is not addressed publicly, the reunification of the reunification remains the primary function of each of the two camps and continuously produces adventurous policies.

The only way out of these battles is to acknowledge the inanity of the policy of reunification.

The powder magazine of Korea can only be pacified under the following conditions:
1- By treaty, the two Koreas give up any policy of reunification, of hegemony over one another, of the state encroachment of the sovereignty of one on the other, of the subjection of one to political or military units desired by the other.

2- The United States and Japan commit themselves by a treaty with the states concerned to never cross the 38th parallel, to invade North Korea, to install troops there, to include it in a military network that is favorable to them, either directly or through intermediaries.

3- The Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China undertake by treaty with the States concerned to never cross the 38th parallel, invade South Korea, install troops there, include it in a military network either favorably, directly or through intermediaries.

These discussions could be held in Paris where a place had already presided over this function during the Vietnam War.

If no one wants to give up anything, the military and nuclear arsenal will continue to accumulate and eventually explode; by chance but necessarily.

The whole question is whether, once again, the States concerned have no interest in maintaining a powder magazine which they are convinced of controlling; as in Sarajevo in 1914.


Marc SALOMONE



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